Peirce’s Notion of Abduction and Deweyan Inquiry by Koschmann, Timothy
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Conference Proceedings Department of Medical Education
4-2003
Peirce’s Notion of Abduction and Deweyan Inquiry
Timothy Koschmann
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/meded_confs
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL,
April, 2003.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Medical Education at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Conference Proceedings by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Koschmann, Timothy, "Peirce’s Notion of Abduction and Deweyan Inquiry" (2003). Conference Proceedings. Paper 2.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/meded_confs/2
 Peirce’s Notion of Abduction 





Dept. of Medical Education 
Southern Illinois University 
 
 In two recently published articles Prawat (2000, 2001) 
advanced a controversial thesis with regard to the development of 
Dewey’s thought over the course of his career.  He offered the 
observation that Dewey’s thinking undertook a radical shift in 
mid-career away from a Jamesian version of pragmatism toward one 
more closely aligned with the writings of C.S. Peirce.  As a 
result of this “discontinuity,” Prawat argued that Dewey’s 
writing can be divided into two phases: the early “inductionist” 
Dewey and the later “social constructivist” Dewey.  Prawat’s 
‘two-Deweys’ thesis is at odds with other accounts of Dewey’s 
development as a thinker such as Garrison’s (1997) and Garrison 
(2001) has called some of the premises underlying Prawat’s thesis 
into question.  I have no wish to take a position with regard to 
this dispute specifically, but instead hope to raise a question 
with reference to a presupposition underlying these and an 
earlier Prawat article (Prawat, 1999). 
Within these articles Prawat undertakes to conflate Peirce 
and Dewey’s respective descriptions of the processes of inquiry.  
Prawat (2001) concludes, “The fact that inquiry is both public 
and private, social and individual, the fact that it is both 
continuous and fallible—these ideas and more are key in Dewey’s 
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system, and they bear the stamp of the man Dewey called the 
‘philosopher’s philosopher’” (p. 719).  Disregarding previous 
accounts that highlight differences in Peirce and Dewey’s 
treatments of inquiry (cf., Burke, 1994; Sleeper, 2001), Prawat 
adopts a pattern of presentation by which Peirce and Dewey are 
cited as though they spoke with a single authorial voice (e.g., 
“Like the postmodernists who single out language, P. and D. argue 
…” [Prawat, 1999, p. 59], “Of this, P. and D. are quite insistent 
…” [Prawat, 1999, p. 59], “Ala P., D. argues …” [Prawat, 2000, p. 
???], “Taking a chapter out of P.’s book, D. argues …” [Prawat, 
2001, p. 680], “…, D. writes paraphrasing P., …” [Prawat, 2001, 
p. 691], “P. and D. insist …” [Prawat, 2001, p. 695]). This begs 
the potentially contentious question, however, of whether or not 
their respective conceptualizations were indeed the same. 
In these two pieces, Prawat appears particularly keen to 
establish a connection between Peirce’s notion of abduction and 
Dewey’s later writing.  He (2001) offers the following quote from 
the revised edition of How We Think: 
There is a time during our investigation when meaning is 
only suggested: when we hold it in suspense as a possibility 
rather than accept it as an actuality.  Then the meaning is 
an idea.  An idea thus stands midway between assured 
understanding and mental confusion and bafflement.  (p. 692, 
original quote LW8: 2211) 
Commenting on this passage, Prawat (2001) wrote: 
                     
1
 Throughout the paper, I will employ this format for all citations to Dewey’s 
writings.  The citations refer to the collected works edited by J.A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: SIU Press) and organized into three sets of volumes, the 
Early Works (EW) 1882-1898, the Middle Works (MW) 1899-1924, and the Late 
Works (LW) 1925-1953.  Citations in this form, therefore, specify a volume 
number and, in most cases, a page number or range of page numbers within the 
volume.  
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This maps nicely onto Peirce’s notion of abduction.  
Clearly, Dewey came as close as one could to describing 
Peirce’s process without actually using Peirce’s novel term.  
(p. 692) 
Given this convergence in thinking, however, Prawat professed to 
be puzzled by Dewey’s failure to adopt Peirce’s terminology. He 
(2001) wrote: 
Interestingly enough, Dewey never actually used the term 
“abduction” to describe the process of idea generation in 
his own work.  There is ample evidence, however, that Dewey 
fully embraced the concept.  (p. 691) 
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the nature of that 
evidence.  It begins with a short review of the ways in which 
Peirce employed this concept within his own writing. 
 
Peirce’s notion of abduction 
 The task of appreciating Peirce’s notion of abduction is 
complicated by two factors: first, because he used different 
terms to refer to the same underlying concept and, second, 
because he employed the underlying concept for different purposes 
at different points in his career.  In an early paper entitled 
“The Consequences of Four Incapacities” Peirce wrote, “All valid 
reasoning is either deductive, inductive, or hypothetic; or else 
it combines two or more of these characters” (CP 5.274)2. In an 
entry on “Reasoning” in the Dictionary of Philosophy and 
                     
2
 Unless otherwise specified, citations to Peirce will follow this form.  
References are to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958) edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, 
and A. Burks and published in eight volumes.  Citations take the form of a 
volume number followed by a paragraph number or range of paragraph numbers. 
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Psychology published in 1901, Peirce introduced the term 
presumption and wrote, “Presumption is the only kind of reasoning 
which supplies new ideas, the only kind which is, in this sense, 
synthetic” (CP 2.777).  Later, in his 1903 Harvard lectures, 
Peirce employed the same taxonomy as that presented in the 
“Incapacities” paper but substituted the term abduction for 
hypothetic reasoning: 
Th[e] three kinds of reasoning are Abduction, Induction, and 
Deduction.  Deduction is the only necessary reasoning.  It 
is the reasoning of mathematics.  It starts from a 
hypothesis, the truth or falsity of which has nothing to do 
with the reasoning; and of course its conclusions are 
equally ideal.  The ordinary use of the doctrine of chances 
is necessary reasoning, although it is reasoning concerning 
probabilities.  Induction is the experimental testing of a 
theory.  The justification of it is that, although the 
conclusion at any stage of the investigation may be more 
less erroneous, yet the further application of the same must 
correct the error.  The only thing that induction 
accomplishes is to determine the value of a quantity.  It 
sets out with a theory and measures the degree of 
concordance or that theory with fact.  It never can 
originate any idea whatever.  No more can deduction.  All 
the ideas of science come to it by the way of abduction.  
Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory 
to explain them.  Its only justification is that if we are 
ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way.  
(CP 5.145) 
In “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” a paper written 
five years later, Peirce observed: 
The whole series of mental performances between the notice 
of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the 
hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding 
seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at 
its mercy,—the search for pertinent circumstances and the 
laying hold of them, sometimes without our cognizance, the 
scrutiny of them, the dark laboring, the bursting out of the 
startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to 
the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a 
lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility,—I reckon 
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as composing the First Stage of Inquiry.  Its characteristic 
formula of reasoning I term Retroduction, i.e., reasoning 
from consequent to antecedent.  (CP 6.469) 
In this quote and other unpublished manuscripts (c.f., Peirce 
Edition Project, 1998, Vol. 2, pp. 287-288), Peirce took 
abduction (or retroduction as it is labeled here) to be not only 
a type of argument, but also a preliminary stage of inquiry. 
 Though his terminology varied, the underlying notion was one 
that preoccupied Peirce over the course of his entire career.  
First, he wished to give an account of the process by which 
scientific discovery is accomplished (c.f., CP 5.172).  Peirce is 
credited with the observation that the logic of discovery is 
distinctively different from other forms of reasoning (see CP 
5.146).3  On a grander scale, Pierce wished to construct an 
architectonic, that is a systematic framework based on formal 
logic (in the style of Kant) within which the totality of 
knowledge could be accommodated.  His logic was one constructed 
on a theory of signs.  Arguments, for Peirce, were treated as 
“rationally persuasive signs” (Peirce Edition Project, 1998, Vol 
2, pp. 275) composed of more simple sign forms.  To construct his 
architectonic, Peirce needed to provide an exhaustive list of 
argument types and abduction was necessary for this purpose.  
Finally, in the latter part of his career, Peirce dedicated 
himself to the task of providing a proof for his pragmatism (see 
Houser, 1998).  His closing lecture in the 1903 Harvard series 
was entitled “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction.”  Abduction, 
                     
3
 This claim of Peirce’s has received considerable attention of late among 
philosophers of science.  See Kapitan (1997) and Hintikka (1998). 
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therefore, initially introduced as a residual category to account 
for the weak form of reasoning employed in the early stages of 
scientific discovery, became a crucial component of his intended 
proof.  As part of “The Three Cotary Propositions” (CP 5.180-
181), Peirce asserted that abduction “shades into” perception 
thereby providing an uninterrupted chain from perception to 
perceptual judgments. 
 
How (and where) does Dewey reference abduction? 
 Prawat (1999) wrote: “The process that Peirce and Dewey 
credit with giving rise to ideas, termed abduction, defies easy 
description” (p. 59).  But, as Prawat himself pointed out, Dewey 
never explicitly referenced it in his published work.  This 
naturally raises the question, where and in what terms did Dewey 
discuss the concept variously labeled by Peirce as abduction, 
hypothetic reasoning, presumption, and retroduction? 
 In “Dewey, Peirce, and the Learning Paradox,” Prawat (1999) 
attempted to weave together Dewey’s notion of experience, 
Peirce’s concept of abduction, and his own theory of idea-based 
social constructivism (Prawat, 1993).  How these ideas are tied 
together, however, is a little murky.  Prawat wrote, “Abduction 
involves reasoning from the known (rule) to the new or unknown 
(case) by way of metaphoric leap or projection” (p. 62).  He then 
gives an extended example based on Peirce’s postulated stages in 
the interpretation of a sign.  The connection to Dewey is loose, 
however.  Metaphor is offered as a means by which ideas could be 
linked to the existensial conditions from which they arose.  The 
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connection to idea-based social constructivism is even weaker.  
Idea-based social constructivism in Prawat (1993) is presented as 
a theory of learning with associated pedagogical recommendations 
(about which I will have more to say later).  In Prawat (1999), 
however, Prawat’s theory becomes Dewey’s (“Dewey’s approach has 
been described as one that best fits the label idea-based social 
constructivism.” p. 60).  An explicit description of where Dewey 
applies Peirce’s notion of abduction is nowhere to be found. 
 Prawat (2001) was more specific in “Dewey and Peirce, the 
Philosopher’s Philosopher.”  It is here that we encounter the 
quote from the revised edition of How We Think (LW8) that Prawat 
suggested “maps nicely onto Peirce’s notion of abduction” (p. 
692).  Lest we be too hasty in conflating Peirce’s notion of 
abduction with the phase of idea or hypothesis generation in 
Dewey’s model of inquiry, however, it is best to bear in mind 
possible differences in perspective among Dewey and Peirce.  For 
example, Sleeper (2001), drawing on Peirce’s correspondence with 
Dewey around 1905, noted sharp differences in their respective 
positions with respect to the nature of inquiry and other 
matters.  By Sleeper’s account, Dewey’s ideas regarding logic and 
scientific discovery were on a collision course with the project 
that Peirce had set for himself in the latter part of his career 
and this was already apparent at the time that Studies in Logic 
(MW2) was published.  If this was true, Dewey’s failure to use 
some of Peirce’s terminology may not have been as inexplicable as 
Prawat contends. 
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 I enthusiastically endorse Prawat’s contention that Peirce’s 
notion of abduction is important and worthy of careful study by 
educators.  Peirce’s contributions to logic and the foundations 
of science have received much attention from philosophers, but 
have been almost completey neglected in educational circles.  
Given Dewey’s contributions to educational theory, it would also 
be worthwhile to understand how Peirce’s notion relates to 
Deweyan inquiry but this will require further, careful 
scholarship. In the meantime, it might be useful to examine why 
Prawat might be so keen to identify a discontinuity in Dewey’s 
thought. 
 
The problematic situation and idea-based social constructivism 
 In the article in which he introduced his theory of idea-
based social constructivism, Prawat (1993) was critical of 
methods of instruction that depend upon learning in the context 
of practical problem solving.  He argued that such methods 
produce a form of learning that is overly instrumental and in 
which learners fail to appreciate important ideas in their full 
profundity.  Prawat sought support for this position in Dewey’s 
early writing, specifically in the first edition of How We Think 
(MW6).  
 It was in a later article, that Prawat introduced his two-
Deweys thesis. Prawat (2000) summarized the educational 
philosophy of the early “inductionist” Dewey as, “The teacher’s 
role is to guide the child toward a resolution of the problem 
that stands between the person and his or her needs or interests” 
Peirecean Abduction and Deweyan Inquiry 9 
 
(p. ???). For the later “social constructivist” Dewey, however, 
Prawat argued that “worthwhile experiences … are those where the 
teacher ‘deposits’ powerful ideas” (p. ???).  The two-Deweys 
thesis might be construed as an attempt to disown certain parts 
of Dewey’s intellectual legacy while retaining others.  
Dismissing Dewey’s treatment of inquiry as belonging to Dewey’s 
immature, “inductionist” period, for example, might serve to 
support some of Prawat’s pedagogical recommendations, but it 
would also seem to be at odds with the historical development of 
Dewey’s thought.  Inquiry took a more and more prominent role in 
Dewey’s thinking in the latter part of his career and it is in 
this area that his interests most closely coincided with those of 
Peirce. 
 In his most elaborate article to date on the confluence of 
Peirce and Dewey’s thought, Prawat (2001) seems finally to have 
come to grips with the indeterminate or problematic situation as 
a starting point for inquiry and he comes to it by way of Peirce.  
He wrote, “According to Peirce, the ‘irritation of doubt’ is what 
gives rise to inquiry” (p. 679).  He hastens to add, however, 
that Peirce’s doubt is not the same as that described by the 
early “inductionist” Dewey, though examples of Dewey’s 
dispreferred treatment are not provided.4  Prawat (2001) suggests 
                     
4
 Prawat wrote: 
The kind of doubt Peirce has in mind, however, is not the same as that 
emphasized by the early Dewey, best defined as hesitancy about how to 
act or proceed [CP 5.374].  Rather, it is doubt associated with a 
violation of expectation, the kind that arises when one expects one 
thing and observes another. (p. 679) 
In a footnote to CP 5.373, Peirce wrote: 
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that, in his later writings, Dewey uses the term inference to 
describe the process of idea generation, a process Prawat treats 
as synonymous with Peircean abduction.5  Idea generation, 
however, is always situated.  It takes place within a material 
setting that has in some way grown to be problematic or 
disordered.  Prawat appears to agree and describes the object of 
inquiry for Peirce to be “That of transforming disordered into 
ordered events” (p. 691). 
 When we extend Peirce’s model of inquiry to learning, 
however, we begin to see some problems for the pedagogical 
recommendations associated with Prawat’s theory of learning 
(i.e., idea-based social constructivism). Prawat (1993) espouses 
a curriculum consisting of “a matrix or network of big ideas” (p. 
13).  The teacher’s job is to “deposit” these ideas, presumably 
into the receptive heads of the students.  Prawat is critical of 
instructional methods that rely upon placing the learner in 
problem-solving situations. 
                                                                  
Doubt, however, is not usually hesitancy about what is to be done then 
and there.  It is anticipated hesitancy about what I shall do hereafter, 
or a feigned hesitancy about a fictitious state of things. 
Peirce does not attribute the first treatment of doubt to Dewey and Prawat 
provides no evidence that Dewey employs this definition in his early writing. 
 
5
 This may not be entirely accurate.  Dewey wrote in How We Think (Rev. Ed.), 
for example: 
Positive inference can be deferred and kept in process of development 
and test while a meaning is not asserted and believed in.  Moreover, 
ideas are indispensable to inference because they direct observations 
and regulate the collection and inspection of data.  (LW8: 221-222). 
Dewey’s use of inference here would seem to have a scope that would go beyond 
just the phase of idea generation. 
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 A key insight from Dewey is that true learning always takes 
place in situations that are experienced by the learner as 
problematic.  Prawat’s theory of idea-based social constructivism 
seems to focus too closely on the idea generated and not on the 
situation within which the idea was produced.  In redressing this 
shortcoming, Prawat must rethink his pedagogical recommendations 
to bring them more consistently in line with Dewey’s theory of 
inquiry.  If unwilling to do so, he must abandon any pretense of 
basing his pedagogical recommendations on Dewey’s writings, 
because to deny Dewey’s basic insights with regard to inquiry is 




Thanks to the good folks at the Center for Dewey Studies for 
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this manuscript. 
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